Finally, the agreement stipulates that the United States will begin diplomatic talks with the United Nations to remove Taliban members from the “sanctions list.” U.S. Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad said on Twitter that the two sides had agreed on a “tripartite agreement that codifies the rules and procedures of their negotiations on a political roadmap and a comprehensive ceasefire.” That is why the Afghan government was not a party to the agreement between the United States and the Taliban. Instead, the February 2020 agreement only committed the Taliban to negotiate directly with the Afghans. In a variation of this contingency, the Afghan government and the Taliban could reach a fragile interim agreement, but one or both sides would not implement part of the agreement. This situation could put the United States in a precarious position. It should decide whether it should continue to withdraw its forces because the parties have reached an agreement or whether it must stop the withdrawal until a solution is found. The annexes to the agreement between the United States and the Taliban, which has never been published, should limit the fighting. According to a well-placed source, the Taliban were allowed to continue their operations in rural areas, but not in major cities. The United States has reached an agreement with the Taliban, but considerable challenges remain, such as political power-sharing, the role of Islam and women`s rights in achieving intra-Afghan peace. The second path to a failure of an agreement involves a situation in which internal peace talks begin, but either negotiations are suspended or the implementation of an interim agreement faces serious problems. But the Taliban have their own leadership problems.
The team negotiating the Doha peace agreement does not necessarily argue in favour of Taliban commanders on the ground, who may not be ready or able to give up the fight and lay down their arms. This leaves room for continued struggle, even after an agreement in Kabul. On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement that was to be a first step towards an intra-Afghan peace agreement. The main provisions of the agreement were the U.S. commitment to withdraw all U.S. and foreign troops from Afghanistan, a Taliban promise to prevent Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from using Afghan territory to threaten the United States and its partners, and a promise from both sides to support peace negotiations within Afghanistan. As part of the agreement, the United States promised to reduce the number of U.S. troops from about 14,000 to 8,600 troops, proportionately reduce the number of other international forces in Afghanistan, and cooperate with both sides to release the prisoners. There have been some remarkable problems with the agreement, such as the Afghan government`s lack of involvement in the negotiations.
It was an attempt to make the most of a bad situation. Another problem is that the recent Afghan presidential elections were contested and led to a divided and dysfunctional government in Kabul. As two opponents declare themselves the winners, no one is responsible in Kabul anymore. Since the next step in the peace agreement is to hold talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, a divided and broken government in Kabul complicates this next step.